Boxer Protocol

Boxer Protocol
Signature page of the Boxer rebellion settlement
Traditional Chinese 1. 辛丑條約
2. 辛丑各國和約
3. 北京議定書
Simplified Chinese 1. 辛丑条约
2. 辛丑各国和约
3. 北京议定书
Literal meaning 1. Xinchou (year 1901) treaty
2. Xinchou (year 1901) all-nation peace treaty
3. Beijing protocol

The Boxer Protocol was signed on September 7, 1901 between the Qing Empire of China and the Eight-Nation Alliance that had provided military forces (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands after China's defeat in the intervention to put down the Boxer Rebellion at the hands of the Eight-Power Expeditionary Force. It is often regarded as one of the Unequal Treaties.

Contents

Names

In Western countries, it was also known as the Treaty of 1901, Peace Agreement between the Great Powers and China. The full name of the protocol is Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Russia, Spain, United States and China—Final Protocol for the Settlement of the Disturbances of 1900, reflecting its nature as a diplomatic protocol rather than a peace treaty at the time of signature.

In China, it was known as the Xinchou Treaty. It was later regarded as one of the "Unequal Treaties".

Negotiations during the Boxer Rebellion

The Qing dynasty was by no means defeated when the Allies took control of Beijing. They Allies had to temper the demands they sent in a message to Xi'an to get the Dowager Empress to agree with them; for instance, China did not have to give up any land. Many of the Dowager Empress's advisers in the Imperial Court insisted that the war be carried on against the foreigners, arguing that China could defeat the foreigners since it was the disloyal and traitorous people within China who allowed Beijing and Tianjin to be captured by the Allies, and the interior of China was impenetrable. Dong Fuxiang was also recommended by them to continue fighting. The Dowager was practical, and decided that the terms were generous enough for her to acquiesce and stop the war, when she was assured of her continued reign after the war.[1]

Signatories

Prince Qing and Li Hongzhang signed the protocol on behalf of the Qing Empire, while Bernardo de Cólogan y Cólogan, Alfons Mumm (Freiherr von Schwarzenstein), Ernest Satow and Komura Jutaro signed on behalf of Spain, Germany, Britain and Japan respectively. At that time, Spain had no territorial concessions in China, but Bernardo J. de Cólogan was the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps and the eldest diplomat of the Foreign Compound in Beijing.[2]

The Clauses

450 million taels of silver were to be paid as indemnity over a course of 39 years to the eight nations involved.[3] Under the exchange rates at the time, 450 million taels was equal to US$ 335 million gold dollars or £67 million,[3] approximately equal to US$6.653 billion today.[4]

The Chinese paid the indemnity in gold on a rising scale with a 4% interest charge until the debt was amortized on December 31, 1940. After 39 years, the amount was almost 1 billion taels (precisely 982,238,150).[3]

The sum was to be distributed as follows: Russia 28.97%, Germany 20.02%, France 15.75%, United Kingdom 11.25%, Japan 7.73%, United States 7.32%, Italy 7.32%, Belgium 1.89%, Austria-Hungary 0.89%, Netherlands 0.17%, and Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Norway 0.025%。 Also, additional 16,886,708 taels was paid at local level in 17 provinces. By 1938, 652.37 million taels had been paid. The interest rate (of 4% per annum) was to be paid semi-annually with the first payment being the July 1, 1902.

The Qing government was also to allow the foreign countries to base their troops in Beijing. In addition, the foreign powers had placed the Empress Cixi on their list of war criminals, although provincial officers such as Li Hongzhang and Yuan Shikai defended her, claiming that she had no control whatsoever over the whole escapade. She was later removed from the list, though she was to step down from power and discontinue any participation in the affairs of state.

Other clauses included:

Traditional Chinese Simplified Chinese Pinyin Translated names from early text
黃村 黄村 Huangcun Huang-tsun
郎坊(廊坊) 郎坊(廊坊) Langfang Lang-fang
楊村 杨村 Yangcun Yang-tsun
天津 天津 Tianjin Tien-tsin
軍糧城 军粮城 Junliangcheng Chun-liang-Cheng
塘沽 塘沽 Tanggu Tong-ku
蘆臺 芦台 Lutai Lu-tai
唐山 唐山 Tangshan Tong-shan
灤州 滦州 Luanzhou Lan-chou
昌黎 昌黎 Changli Chang-li
秦皇島 秦皇岛 Qinhuangdao Chin-wang Tao
山海關 山海关 Shanhaiguan Shan-hai Kuan

Hoax Demands

The French Catholic vicar apostolic, Msgr. Alfons Bermyn wanted foreign troops garrisoned in inner Mongolia, but the Governor refused. Bermyn resorted to lies, and falsely petitioned the Manchu Enming to send troops to Hetao where Prince Duan's Mongol troops and General Dong Fuxiang's Muslim troops allegedly threatened Catholics. It turned at that Bermyn had created the incident as a hoax.[7][8] One of the false reports claimed that Dong Fuxiang wiped out Belgian missionaries in Mongolia and was going to massacre Catholics in Taiyuan.[9]

Demands Rejected by China

The Qing did not capitulate to all the foreign demands. The Manchu Governor Yuxian was executed, but the Imperial court refused to execute the Chinese General Dong Fuxiang, both were anti foreign and had encouraged the killing of foreigners during the rebellion.[10] Instead, General Dong Fuxiang lived a life of luxury and power in "exile" in his home province of Gansu.[11][12]

In addition to not only sparing Dong Fuxiang, the Qing also refused to exile the Boxer supporter Zaiyi to Xinjiang, as the foreigners demanded. Instead, he moved to Alashan, west of Ningxia, and lived in the residence of the local Mongol prince. He then moved to Ningxia during the Xinhai Revolution when the Muslims took control of Ningxia, and finally, moved to Xinjiang with Sheng Yun.[13]

Effects

Political

This event also further marked the increased decentralization of power in China, from the central government to the provinces. This is as both Li Hongzhang and Yuan Shikai had delayed and then disobeyed orders from the Qing Government to join the Boxers in the Boxer Rebellion. These two provincial officers had in their hands very powerful armies, namely the Beiyang Army and the New Army, which were later merged under Yuan Shikai after Li Hongzhang's death. Lastly, the defeat in the rebellion and the severity of the protocol initiated the Late-Qing Reforms, which were basically a follow-up of the Hundred Days' Reform, and led to the 1911 Revolution.

Economic

The indemnity of 450 million taels of silver was a large burden on the Chinese, who had to foot it with increased taxes. It is estimated that the entire Qing government income was only about 250 million taels at the time,[3] making the indemnity without interest worth almost two entire years of government revenue. Principal repayments and interest combined over the 39-year duration of the loan, this more than doubled.

Social

The Boxer Protocol was a further blow to what little integrity the Qing government possessed. Some people in China were already dissatisfied with the corrupt and inefficient Qing government, and this only proved that their sentiments were well founded. They had become convinced that the Qing government was utterly incapable of ruling their country, and believed that a revolution was the only way the country could be restored to peace and prosperity.

Remittance

On December 28, 1908, the United States remitted $11,961,121.76 of its share of the Indemnity to support the construction of Tsinghua University in Beijing.[14]

When China declared war on Germany and Austria in 1917, it suspended the combined German and Austrian share of the Boxer Indemnity, which totaled 20.91 percent. At the Paris Peace Conference, Beijing succeeded in completely revoking the German and Austrian shares of the Boxer Indemnity.[15]

The history surrounding Russia's share of the Boxer Indemnity is the most complex of all the nations involved. On December 2, 1918 the Bolsheviks issued an official decree abolishing Russia's share of the Indemnity (146). Upon the arrival of Lev Karakhan in Beijing during the Fall of 1923, however, it became clear that the Soviet Union expected to retain control over how the Russian share was to be spent. Though Karakhan was initially hesitant to follow the United States' example of directing the funds toward education, he soon insisted in private that the Russian share had to be used for that purpose and during February 1924, presented a proposal stating that the "Soviet portion of the Boxer Indemnity would be allocated to Chinese educational institutions."[16]

On March 14, 1924, Karakhan completed a draft Sino-Soviet agreement stating "The government of the USSR agrees to renounce the Russian portion of the Boxer Indemnity." Copies of these terms were published in the Chinese press, and the ensuing positive public reaction encouraged other countries to match the USSR's terms. On May 21, 1924, the U.S. Congress agreed to remit to China the final $6,137,552.90 of the American share. Ten days later, however, it became apparent that the USSR did not intend to carry through on its earlier promise of full renunciation. When the final Sino-Soviet agreement was announced, it specified that Russia's share would be used to promote education in China and that the Soviet government would retain control over how the money was to be used, an exact parallel to the U.S. remittance of 1908.[17]

On March 3, 1925, Great Britain completed arrangements to use its share of the Boxer Indemnity to support railway construction in China. On April 12, France asked that its indemnity be used to reopen a defunct Sino-French Bank. Italy signed an agreement on October 1 to spend its share on the construction of steel bridges. Holland's share paid for harbor and land reclamation, and the Belgian funds were earmarked to be spent on railway material in Belgium. Finally, Japan's indemnity was transferred to develop aviation in China under Japanese oversight[18]

Once these countries' approximately 40 percent of the Boxer Indemnity was added to Germany's and Austria's combined 20.91 percent, the United States' 7.32 percent, and the Soviet Union's 28.97 percent share, the Beijing government had accounted for over 98 percent of the entire Boxer Indemnity. Hence, by 1927, Beijing had almost completely revoked Boxer Indemnity payments abroad and had succeeded in redirecting the payments for use within China[19]

See also

External links

References

  1. ^ Diana Preston (2000). The boxer rebellion: the dramatic story of China's war on foreigners that shook the world in the summer of 1900. USA: Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 312. ISBN 0802713610. http://books.google.com/books?id=iWxKQejMtlMC&pg=PA312&dq=neither+was+china+required+to+surrender+any+territory+Some+members+of+the+exiled+court+had+urged+her+to+continue+the+war,+arguing+that+Peking+and+Tientsin+had+fallen+because+of+traitors,+that+the+allies+could+never+penetrate+the+interior+of+China,+and+that+if+Tung+Fu-hsiang+were+allowed+to#v=onepage&q=neither%20was%20china%20required%20to%20surrender%20any%20territory%20Some%20members%20of%20the%20exiled%20court%20had%20urged%20her%20to%20continue%20the%20war%2C%20arguing%20that%20Peking%20and%20Tientsin%20had%20fallen%20because%20of%20traitors%2C%20that%20the%20allies%20could%20never%20penetrate%20the%20interior%20of%20China%2C%20and%20that%20if%20Tung%20Fu-hsiang%20were%20allowed%20to&f=false. Retrieved March 4, 2011. 
  2. ^ CÓLOGAN Y GONZÁLEZ-MASSIEU, JORGE. «El papel de España en la Revolución de los Bóxers de 1900: Un capítulo olvidado en la Historia de las Relaciones Diplomáticas». Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia. Tomo CCV. Cuaderno III. Pág. 493 a 535.
  3. ^ a b c d Spence, Jonathan D. [1991] (1991), The Search for Modern China, WW Norton & Co. ISBN 0-393-30780-8.
  4. ^ Answers, EH, http://eh.net/atp/answers/0789.php .
  5. ^ Sondhaus, Lawrence. [2001] (2001). Naval Warfare, 1815–1914. Routledge publishing. ISBN 0-415-21477-7
  6. ^ Pamphlets on the Chinese-Japanese War, 1939–1945. [Published 1937] Sino-Japanese Conflict, 1937—45. Digitized May 30, 2007. No ISBN.
  7. ^ Ann Heylen (2004). Chronique du Toumet-Ortos: looking through the lens of Joseph Van Oost, missionary in Inner Mongolia (1915–1921). Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press. p. 203. ISBN 90-5867-418-5. http://books.google.com/?id=WSl5cl_wt24C&pg=PA203&dq=ma+fuxiang+gelaohui#v=onepage&q=ma%20fuxiang%20gelaohui&f=false. Retrieved June 28, 2010. 
  8. ^ Patrick Taveirne (2004). Han-Mongol encounters and missionary endeavors: a history of Scheut in Ordos (Hetao) 1874–1911. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press. p. 539. ISBN 90-5867-365-0. http://books.google.com/?id=z2japTNPRNAC&pg=PA539&dq=prince+mongol+general+whole+affair+hoax+catholic#v=snippet&q=dong%20fuxiang%20reportedly%20catholic%20mongol%20duan%20&f=false. Retrieved June 28, 2010. 
  9. ^ E. H. Edwards (1903). Fire and sword in Shansi: the story of the martyrdom of foreigners and Chinese Christians. EDINBURGH: Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier. p. 167. http://books.google.com/?id=72AuAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA167&dq=have+received+three+times+the+report+that+the+General+Tung+Fu+Hsiang,+in+West+Mongolia,+has+killed+all+Belgian#v=onepage&q=have%20received%20three%20times%20the%20report%20that%20the%20General%20Tung%20Fu%20Hsiang%2C%20in%20West%20Mongolia%2C%20has%20killed%20all%20Belgian&f=false. Retrieved June 28, 2010. 
  10. ^ Stephen G. Haw (2007). Beijing: a concise history. Routledge. p. 98. ISBN 0415399068. http://books.google.com/?id=40WRdm1LstQC&pg=PA98&dq=doing+fuxiang+russian#v=onepage&q&f=false. Retrieved June 28, 2010. 
  11. ^ James Hastings, John Alexander Selbie, Louis Herbert Gray (1916). Encyclopædia of religion and ethics, Volume 8. T. & T. Clark. p. 894. http://books.google.com/books?id=eEwTAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA893&dq=ma+fu+hsiang+mongol#v=onepage&q=bodyguard%20death%20titles%20restored%20remians%20buried%20highest%20honours&f=false. Retrieved June 28, 2010. 
  12. ^ M. Th. Houtsma, A. J. Wensinck (1993). E.J. Brill's first encyclopaedia of Islam 1913–1936. Stanford BRILL. p. 850. ISBN 9004097961. http://books.google.com/books?id=rezD7rvuf9YC&pg=PA850&lpg=PA850&dq=ma+fu-hsiang#v=onepage&q=ma%20fu-hsiang&f=false. Retrieved June 28, 2010. 
  13. ^ Travels Of A Consular Officer In North-West China. CUP Archive. p. 188. http://books.google.com/books?id=fdk8AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA188&dq=ma+fu+hsiang++mongol+an-liang#v=onepage&q=prince%20tuan%20boxer%20leader%20retired%20alashan&f=false. Retrieved June 28, 2010. 
  14. ^ Elleman, B: Diplomacy and Deception, page 144. M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
  15. ^ Elleman, B: Diplomacy and Deception, page 145. M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
  16. ^ Elleman, B: Diplomacy and Deception, page 147. M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
  17. ^ Elleman, B: Diplomacy and Deception, page 148. M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
  18. ^ Elleman, B: Diplomacy and Deception, page 154. M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
  19. ^ Elleman, B: Diplomacy and Deception, page 155. M.E. Sharpe, 1998.